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CPYRGHT Duried Intelligence By EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT

WASHINGTON. - Washingis placing practically exclusive emphasis on Red China as the

mainr outside influence in the Vietnam war. Tris flies in the face of repeated avowals by the USSR and evid nce that it is providing the sincurs and the brains for what it calls the "Liberation War" in Vict-



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, nam. In its public releases, our State Department either completely ignores Soviet Russia's massive involvement in the war or plays down its significance.

The great extent of Soviet aid had been publicly admitted by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee. He has warned that Soviet Russia would not allow the United States to achieve its goals in Vietnam.

In a speech before the ple-

"We have already delivered and are delivering to the Democratic Republic of Victnem. ment. Our policy is to continue to deliver it every assistance, both material and political, ons procurement and the size which it will need to repulse United States aggression."

THE SOVIETS are doing just that. Soviet and Czechmade anti-aircraft artillery is taking a consistently lieavy toll of American planes flying over targets in North Victnam.

terred as they consistently carry thousands of tons of military and paramilitary capable of meetin equipment into the port of its requirements.

The reason Washington is playing down Moscow's important role in the Vietnam war should be obvious. It '! would embarrass our policy 4 of "building bridges"- increasing East - West trade. Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, said in Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 21, 1965 that Congress would be asked to "examine recommendations for changes in East - West trade policy." This implied an increase of our trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites enabling them to increase their military zid to Vietnam.

The official justification for this is to be found in what are called "National Intelligence, Estimates, These reflect the Stare Department theory that Soviet Russia is "mellowing" and is not a threat to United States security. An intelligence i estimate is a judgment regarding the probability of future political and military developments of our intelligence compley Periodically, staff-men on CIA Beard of Na-In a speech hefore the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on Sept. 29, 1965, he intentions and capabilities of Communist countries.

THE PRESIDENT and his Cabinet use these as a basis a considerable amount of for policy formulation, dealing weapons and military equip- with the budget, military reacarch and development, weap-

> of our military forces. These estimates are also largely usedto set United States policy in regard to trade with the Sovict bloc.

Since World War II, these !estimates have provided the rationale for export to Moscow. of supplies and equipment that Soviet bloc ships are under the Soviets vitally need for their military build-up. The es-. timates pictured a Soviet bloc. capable of meeting the bulk of

rence estimates were used to justify deleting or downgrading some 77 categories of machine tools from the Battle Act list which barred their shipment behind the Iron Curtain. According to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Robert Am-ory Ir., the CIA's former Deputy Director for intelligence Preduction, said his access access tell the access for median tools.

Yet Soviet statistics are not to refer to the access access to median tools. wholiv upreliation a fact frequertly nowitted by Saviet officials. Amory's unbelievable statement can be found in on pages 303 and 307 of the Subcommittee hearing en-Hied "Export of Strategic Materials to the USSR and other Saviet Blac Countries," Part 2, Oct. 24, 1981.

Our Government's inflated evaluation of the Soviet economy became so widely known that it van finally contradicted by the its unprecedentedly-published support of lan. 9-1962 and by a State Department report tast Septem-ber. By that time, as usual, partment the damage had already been done. For nearly a decade, critical intelligence facts pointing to glaring gaps in the Soviet economy were either overlooked or deliberately ignored.

from exploiting what could have been crippling weaknesses in the USSR's capacity for fostering "liberation wars." At the same time, we set the example for England and others of our allies to furnish the items the Reds critically needed on the grounds ! that these were not stralegie any longer since the Soviets were capable of manufacture ing them anyway.

Today Amory is no lower in government. This is irrele-Vant. The same small group of faceless wribes is directing the drive for more East-Wort trade, dovetailing hilo Moscow's propaganda campaign with the same objective. the Nitral Security Council and currently on the station McGeorge Rundy ton president of the Nitral Security Council and currently on the station McGeorge Rundy ton president of Alfairs. Among these officials is a pro-

Some time ago, the Administration sent an official trade; mission to Rumania and Poland. This writer has seen some half a dozen letters from businessmen who claim that the State Department urged them to participate in a trade mission with the Soviet Union on the grounds that "It is in the interest of the United States Ginvernment." Of course, this incilitates Moscow's aid to lipuol.

THUS, WE WERE prevented Approved For Release 2001/08/01: CIA-RDP75-00001R000100170023-4